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Conceived as a relatively simple arrangement that 
allowed international expansion by hotel chain opera-
tors without the risk of real estate ownership, the 
management contract has become an intricate and 
nearly essential element of the contemporary hotel 
industry. While trends in management contracts have 
shifted with the relative bargaining power of owners 
and operators, the key to a successful contract is 
aligning the interests of all parties. Owners seek 
some reasonable guarantee of cash flow, while oper-
ators need assurance that they will be able to benefit 
from their continued operation of a property. In place 
of a single document, management contracts now 
include numerous concurrent agreements that 
address such matters as real property rights; intellec-
tual property rights; hotels as financial assets; hotels 
as operating businesses; and the needs of owners, 
operators, and lenders.
Keywords: management contracts; operator and 
owner bargaining power; management 
contract provisions
Hotel management contracts have become a fix-ture in the hotel industry for most full-service, upscale, luxury, resort, and convention prop-
erties. The American Hotel & Lodging Association 
(AH&LA; 2009) estimates that there are eight hun-
dred management companies managing 12,000 
properties worldwide. More than one-third of that 
number, 4,370 hotels, were managed by the nine larg-
est hotel companies in 2006 (Eyster and deRoos 
2009). This article provides a historical overview of 
hotel management contracts and serves as a benchmark 
for management contract practice in 2009. A subse-
quent article will examine future trends.
The earliest definitive analysis of hotel management 
contracts appeared in a series of Cornell Quarterly 
articles written in 1977 by Professor James Eyster of 
Cornell’s School of Hotel Administration (For example, 
see Eyster 1977). By this time, management contracts 
had achieved a notable presence in the industry.
Management contracts were developed starting in 
the 1950s, when the large hotel operators, particularly 
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Hilton, InterContinental, Sheraton, and 
Hyatt, expanded internationally. By sepa-
rating ownership from the operation of the 
asset, both parties were better off. The prop-
erty owner, employing the services of a 
professional operator and the brand for a 
fee, could generate significant value and 
cash flows without having to invest in the 
expertise of the hotel business. The opera-
tor, by agreeing to manage the property on 
behalf of the property owner, could gener-
ate significant fee income, expand the reach 
of its brand, and earn profits without hav-
ing to invest in the property needed to sup-
port the operation. The provisions of these 
early contracts, which were relatively 
straightforward, are now characterized as 
being favorable to the operator, given their 
lengthy duration and limited rights by the 
owner to terminate the contract.
The relationship of owner and operator 
began to change in the 1980s, when interna-
tional interests invested heavily in the U.S. 
hotel industry. During this period, hotel 
management contracts were in widespread 
worldwide use, and there was a significant 
body of literature and legal expertise on 
the topic, including the seminal Eyster book 
of 1988. The crash of the commercial real 
estate bubble in 1990 exposed the lodging 
market to significant distress. The resulting 
hotel bankruptcies provoked two long-
lasting developments in management con-
tracts. First, when management contracts 
were tested in the courts, the results were 
generally favorable to owners (for an excel-
lent summary, see Renard and Motley 
2003). Second, due to financial distress 
issues and a perceived misalignment between 
owners and operators, the hotel asset man-
agement discipline arose to provide profes-
sional services to hotel owners. Contracts 
signed in this era are generally character-
ized as favorable to the owner, with sig-
nificant rights of termination and a clearly 
established set of duties for operators.
Contracts grew much more complicated 
in the 1980s and 1990s. What were once 
straightforward clauses were transformed 
to tiered provisions and multiple contracts 
as a result of owners’ and operators’ grow-
ing experience with the positive and trou-
blesome aspects of contracts. Examples 
include
• incentive fee structures based on 
achieving certain levels of cash flow 
or certain levels of profitability as 
measured by (for example) gross 
operating profit (GOP) margins;
• performance termination clauses;
• owner’s rights to approve operating; 
furniture, fixture, and equipment 
(FF&E) replacement; and capital 
expenditure budgets;
• owner’s right to have input on person-
nel decisions;
• owner’s right to terminate—at will, 
upon sale, and upon foreclosure;
• restrictions on blanket indemnification 
of the operator;
• operator’s rights to enforce brand 
standards; and
• operator’s expansion of rights to 
collect sums for centrally provided 
services such as loyalty programs, 
accounting, training, marketing, and 
reservations.
On the strength of another real estate 
bubble, the period from 2000 through 2009 
has been characterized by an explosion 
of hotel management contracts, especially 
by the branded operators. The demand for 
management services outstripped the sup-
ply in many markets, primarily driven by 
the success of the brands in meeting the 
owners’ objectives and the fact that opera-
tors were able to engage in auction-like 
behavior. Given the limitations of real estate 
markets, the best brands have had the abil-
ity to select which of several prospective 
projects they would manage in a given 
market. This ability, combined with the 
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expansion of the lending market and 
competition among lenders for good hotel 
loans, provided a window of opportunity 
for hotel operators to obtain contracts on 
particularly favorable terms from 2000 
through 2008.
No longer. At this writing, both own-
ers and operators are faced with unprec-
edented dreadful performance, possibly 
for an extended period, causing enormous 
stress between the parties. Management 
contracts will certainly be tested again, with 
the likely consequence of changes in recent 
practice. Litigation is expected to spike sig-
nificantly over the next two years. Disagree-
ments between owners and operators may 
escalate, as has occurred at the Four Sea-
sons Aviara, where the parties have resorted 
to changing locks, engaged in personal 
confrontations, and filed competing law-
suits (see Segal 2009).
In this article, I analyze the state of hotel 
management contracts in 2009, drawing 
heavily on a review of contracts written 
during the past ten years, my work with 
practitioners in the course of teaching and 
consulting, and a review of recent writings 
on the topic (see Eyster and deRoos 2009; 
Wales and Ferroni 2008; McDaniel 2008). 
My intent is to provide a benchmark for 
management contracts as the industry 
moves into the next decade and to offer a 
context for the negotiation of new con-
tracts, as well as the administration of 
existing contracts.
Contract Fundamentals
In negotiating a management contract, 
owners and operators keep an eye on five 
fundamental issues. While some are more 
important to one party than the other, they 
form the essence of all contracts. On these 
five points, I have observed a greater level 
of balance between the owner and opera-
tor than at any point in history. These five 
fundamentals form the outline for this arti-
cle, as follows:
• the legal framework;
• investment by the operator in the 
relationship;
• term, renewal, and termination rights;
• fees and system reimbursable charges; 
and
• reporting and controls.
The Legal Framework
The legal framework defines the parties, 
their relationships, and their rights. Far 
from being a single document, a manage-
ment contract involves negotiations that 
can include up to eight concurrent agree-
ments (i.e., preopening management agree-
ment, postopening management agreement, 
brand license, royalty or franchise agree-
ment, marketing agreement, technology 
agreement, employment agreement, and 
technical services agreement).
Separation of the Management 
Contract from the Contract 
for Brand Services
Separation of the postopening man-
agement agreement into two contracts 
(management contract and brand license 
agreement) is an innovation that favors the 
operator. This practice has grown steadily 
in recent years. In a typical negotiation of 
the two contracts, little fee payments are 
associated with the management contract 
itself, typically a base-only fee of less than 
1 percent of revenues. The brand license 
agreement, by contrast, provides for base 
royalty fees of approximately 2 percent 
and an incentive royalty fee that mirrors 
contemporary incentive fee practice in a 
more traditional contract where the man-
agement and brand are bundled. The effect 
is to shift the source of fees from the man-
agement contract to the brand license 
agreement. For international operators, this 
structure produces lower taxes for the 
operator due to differential treatment of 
management fees and license fees. In most 
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cases, the two agreements are cross-
defaulted, but this is not necessarily true in 
all cases. Owners should be careful not to 
expose themselves to a situation in which 
they have the right to terminate the man-
agement contract but are obligated to take 
brand services (and pay the corresponding 
fees) under the brand license agreement.
The Parties to the Contract
In a contemporary management contract, 
each party often incorporates a special-
purpose company; the operating entity is 
a single-asset subsidiary of the operator, 
while the owning entity is a “bankruptcy 
remote” special-purpose entity controlled 
by the owner. The intent of creating these 
entities is to limit liability and to provide 
lenders with a clear foreclosure path should 
the owner default on the hotel loan. It is 
clear that the liability management aspects 
of the special-purpose companies work as 
intended.
However, in the current environment, 
I observe that the lender’s desire to prevent 
owners from using bankruptcy and instead 
force hotels into foreclosure may not be in 
the best interests of any party. I say this 
because the foreclosure process is handled 
in the state courts and its outcomes are 
uncertain, depending on the judge and the 
appointed receiver. On the other hand, 
hotels that have gone through a bankruptcy 
typically use the federal court system, which 
is well equipped to handle a hotel failure 
in relatively predictable fashion. It is clear 
that the bankruptcy process favors borrow-
ers as long as the hotel loan is nonrecourse 
to the borrower; in addition, the bankruptcy 
process provides a lender (the new owner) 
with significant power to terminate or mod-
ify the management contract. The foreclo-
sure process, by contrast, is so unpredictable 
that it would be unfair to characterize it as 
favorable to the operator, but in general, it 
is more likely that the operator’s contract 
would survive a foreclosure process than a 
bankruptcy process.
Two additional legal matters relate to 
the contract; first, the owner and operator 
must consider the matter of whether the 
owner, the operator, or some third party is 
the employer. The second relates to the name 
of the holder of permits, licenses, and other 
rights to do business as hotel. For permits, 
licenses, and other authorizations, it is in 
the owner’s best interests to stipulate that 
the operator is responsible for obtaining and 
maintaining these on behalf of the owner.
With regard to employees, until recently, 
neither the owner nor the operator has 
wished to carry the employees on its payroll 
(see Eyster and deRoos 2009). Each has 
been reluctant to assume the continuing 
business obligations for keeping payroll and 
pension records and for negotiating and 
adhering to labor agreements. Also, neither 
has wanted to be liable for potential tort 
actions or discrimination claims (for a 
discussion of discrimination issues, see 
Sherwyn 2010 [this issue]). Recently, 
though, several operators have expressed 
a preference for employing all property-
level staff, because that gives the operator 
specific competitive and strategic advan-
tages. The most significant of these is the 
ability of the operator to transfer personnel 
to another property in the case of a contract 
termination, depriving the owner of the 
ability to simply terminate a contract under 
the assumption that the hotel will continue 
to operate with the existing staff. In addi-
tion, operators can provide employees with 
long-term career paths, strengthening the 
operator and providing employees with 
career options not available within a given 
property. An innovation found in recent 
contracts is employee leasing or profes-
sional employment organizations (PEOs), 
in which the owner or operator leases 
employees from a third-party company, 
which sometimes is affiliated with the 
owner or operator. These companies handle 
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the management of human resources, 
employee benefits, payroll, and workers’ 
compensation.
The Status of the Agency Relationship 
in Management Contracts
The third major component of the legal 
framework is that of agency, a topic that has 
attracted considerable attention (Renard and 
Motley 2003).1 The relationship between 
the owner and operator is one of principal 
and agent. If the contract and the actions 
of the parties have in fact the substance of 
a principal-agent relationship, the courts 
have affirmed this relationship—even in the 
presence of contract language specifically 
stating that the relationship is not one of 
agency. The agency relationship is decidedly 
in favor of owners, because it provides a 
mechanism for owners to terminate con-
tracts that do not otherwise provide for 
termination. The principal in an agency 
relationship can terminate a contract if the 
agent breaches its fiduciary duty to the prin-
cipal, irrespective of the contract language.
While this matter remains a matter for 
courts to assess, many owners insist on a 
principal-agent relationship. On the other 
hand, some operators insist on language 
establishing an independent contractor rela-
tionship and specifically disclaiming agency. 
Again, only time will tell whether this 
language survives a court test. The State 
of Maryland has addressed the matter 
with Commercial Law §23-102, which 
removes the remedy of at-will termination 
of agency unless that is explicit in the 
agreement. Instead of the common law 
understanding regarding agency, Title 23 
states that the “four corners” of the contract 
govern its enforcement, in recognition of 
the meeting of the minds of the parties to 
the contract.
Dispute-Settlement Mechanisms
Dispute-settlement mechanisms are 
an important component of the legal 
framework—the most common being arbi-
tration or use of experts. Absent any lan-
guage to the contrary, the parties have full 
access to the courts at any time in matters 
under dispute. Operators usually insist on 
language that creates formal dispute set-
tlement mechanisms that have the effect 
of preserving the status quo while the dis-
pute is under consideration, are uncertain 
in outcome, and place decisions outside of 
the contract parties (Wales and Ferroni 
2008; McDaniel 2008).2 As an example of 
current practice in the United States, con-
tract provisions are found along a contin-
uum. At one end of the continuum, contracts 
use arbitration for some, but not all, con-
tract disputes. Arbitration or the use of 
experts would apply typically to disputes 
over the budget, budget definitions, per-
formance termination, and capital expen-
ditures. At the other end of the continuum 
are the few contracts in which the use of 
experts or arbitration is the sole remedy of 
the parties in all disputes.
Real Property Rights 
and Personal Property Rights
The last major component of the legal 
framework is the matter of property rights. 
As a rule, the owner owns the real estate. 
Thus, contracts have long been written with 
the understanding that all real property 
1. It should be noted that the agency matter is the most contentious issue between owners and operators, as 
evidenced by the spirited discussion at the May 2009 Management Contracts Roundtable at Cornell’s 
Hotel School.
2. McDaniel (2008) presents tables showing that arbitration or the use of experts is found in 81 percent of 
North American contracts, 72 percent of contracts in EMEA (Europe, Middle East, Africa), and 72 percent 
of contracts in the Asia-Pacific region.
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and physical personal property remained 
with the owner. In addition, since the oper-
ator was doing business on behalf of the 
owner, all records, data, and other matters 
relating to the hotel business were the 
property of the owner. The courts have 
made it clear that the work performed by 
the operator does not create an interest in 
the hotel and that the contract does not 
create any partnership, joint venture, or 
tenant rights. This position favors owners 
in termination disputes by clearly identify-
ing property rights of the parties.
A new practice gives branded operators 
considerable rights to withhold operating 
information from the owner. In particular, 
guest history and marketing data, as well 
as systems used to operate the hotel, are, 
in essence, owned by the operator. In a 
minority of cases, the operator has secured 
rights to control cash flows in the event of 
the owner’s default on capital obligations. 
While federal bankruptcy law would take 
precedence over this language in a bank-
ruptcy procedure, the language could stand 
in a foreclosure procedure.
Investment by the Operator 
in the Relationship
Operators are often asked to invest in the 
relationship as evidence of their commit-
ment to a project, and operators often invest 
strategically to create an interest in the deal, 
to gain favorable provisions, or to limit the 
owner’s ability to terminate the contract.
Operators may invest with one or more 
of five financial tools. I list them below in 
the order of preference most often cited by 
owners.
• Key money. Generally framed as an 
up-front rebate of fees in the amount 
of less than 5 percent of the capital 
structure, this arrangement often has 
“claw-back” mechanisms for repay-
ment if contract does not run the 
entire initial term.
• Second mortgage loan. Not often used 
due to first-mortgage restrictions, this 
approach was found in a few contracts 
in the 1970s and 1980s. It has since 
fallen into disfavor.
• Mezzanine loan. This investment is 
treated as any other piece of the 
capital stack. Amounts are most often 
between 5 and 10 percent of the 
capital structure. Generally structured 
with a cash sweep and a look-back 
return calculation.
• Cash flow guarantees. Not a cash 
investment in the property, these 
guarantees generally are structured 
to provide the owner with cash flow 
of between 80 and 100 percent of 
the budgeted cash flow for a specific 
number of years (generally less than 
five). The guarantee is calculated on 
an annual basis, with an overall cap 
on the guarantee in an amount that is 
less than 5 percent of the capital 
structure. These also often have a 
claw-back mechanism to recover 
sums paid if cash flow exceeds cer-
tain thresholds.
• Equity investment. Many owners 
consider this approach unacceptable. 
The equity investment by the opera-
tor has the effect of creating a part-
nership relationship between the 
owner and operator and certainly would 
alter any principal-agent relationship. 
Consequently, the use of equity invest-
ment by the operator has fallen into 
disfavor.
When the operator makes a meaningful 
investment in the relationship, the owner 
is expected to recognize the investment by 
agreeing to certain terms that favor the 
operator. Depending on the parties’ objec-
tives, those terms may take the form of 
fees that are a bit higher than market, a 
long initial term and renewal term(s), 
weak termination rights, limited access to 
the courts, or designating Maryland as the 
governing jurisdiction for the contract.
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Term, Renewal, 
and Termination Rights
Once the nature of the operator’s invest-
ment is clear, the parties can substantively 
negotiate the contract term, renewal, and 
termination rights. Any discussion of fees 
must wait until the operator has some 
notion of provisions relating to term and 
termination. Exhibit 1 presents statistics 
for term and renewal (Eyster and deRoos 
2009).
As has been true for many years, the 
term and renewals for branded operators is 
substantially longer than those for inde-
pendent operators. Similarly, independent 
operators have weaker termination rights 
than do branded operators, as shown in 
Exhibit 2.
Since most brand operator contracts do 
not provide for termination without cause, 
performance-related termination is gener-
ally seen to be in the owner’s favor. The 
original intent was to give the owner 
rights to terminate the contract during the 
initial or renewal term should the operator 
perform poorly. Interestingly, a contem-
porary performance termination clause 
operates primarily as a cash flow guaran-
tee and not a termination device. A typical 
performance termination clause operates 
as follows:
• Poor performance is defined as a fail-
ure to achieve some fraction of the 
budgeted GOP, generally between 80 
and 100 percent.
• The poor performance must continue 
for more than one year. Many differ-
ent forms of time measurement are 
in place, including a rolling twelve-
month period, two of three consecu-
tive years, and two (or even three) 
consecutive years.
• If there is a terminable event, the oper-
ator is given the opportunity to cure 
the performance failure and avoid ter-
mination by giving (or lending) the 
owner the difference between the actual 
GOP and the benchmark. There may 
be a claw-back provision on the cures 
in the event that future performance 
exceeds the benchmark or the contract 
is terminated prematurely.
• In addition, there is a force majeure 
clause that makes any terminable event 
subject to a market test. In general, as 
Exhibit 1:
Initial Terms and renewals
  Number of Length of
 Initial Term Renewals Renewals
 (Median Years) (Median) (Median Years)
brand operators    
Full-service  16  2  10
Independent operators    
Full-service (no equity)  6  2  4
Select service  9  2  5
Caretaker operatorsa    
Full-service  1  1  1
Source: Adapted from Eyster and deRoos (2009, Exhibit III-3).
a. Caretaker operators are usually independent operators. Frequently, initial contract terms state that the contract continues 
indefinitely until notice of cancellation is given either with or without cause by either owner or operator. If the contract is 
terminated before the end of the initial term, the owner is usually obligated to pay management fees for the remainder of 
the current term; thus, initial terms are quite short.
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long as the hotel is achieving its long-
term market share of room revenues, 
no termination is possible.
Operators often have unlimited cure 
rights and can unilaterally decide whether to 
cure or be terminated. In addition, the use of 
a performance termination clause provides a 
mechanism for operators to keep owners 
from exerting too much control over bud-
geting and operations. Since the operator is 
at all times responsible for the budget via 
the performance clause, the operator should 
make its best possible effort to produce an 
accurate, defensible budget and then achieve 
that budget. Owners are reluctant to allow 
operators to avoid performance termination 
liability by taking control of the budget 
away from the operator.
No discussion of termination rights 
would be complete without noting the 
role of subordination, nondisturbance, and 
attornment agreements (SNDA), or tri-party 
agreements, which limit the lender’s rights 
and which represent a sea change in con-
tract status. Over the past ten years, opera-
tors have been increasingly successful at 
binding the lender to the operator by using 
SNDA language from commercial real 
estate. Using this agreement, the operator 
seeks the status of an important tenant, 
whose rights survive a foreclosure proce-
dure. The acceptance of these agreements 
in foreclosure and ability of the manage-
ment contract to survive a foreclosure is a 
fundamental change in management con-
tracts and will be more vigorously negoti-
ated in the future. While there is a possibility 
Exhibit 2:
Owner Termination
 All Properties Except Caretakera
 Brand Independent
Without cause   
Frequency in contracts   
at any time  0%  42%
after predetermined periodb  15%  2%
required notice period (days)  90-365  30
Termination fee multiplec  3-5  1-5
On-sale   
No operator option to purchase  35%  67%
Operator option to purchased  56%  22%
Operator option to continue  72%  38% 
  with new operator
Termination fee multiplec  2-5  0.5-2.5
On-foreclosure   
Frequency in contracts  80%  80%
Termination fee multiplec  0-2  0-1
Source: Adapted from Eyster and deRoos (2009, Exhibit III-7).
a. Caretaker operators: when an owner terminates a contract before the end of the initial term, most contracts require the 
owner to pay the caretaker operator management fees for the remainder of the contract term.
b. Usually from between one to three years.
c. Multiple of most recent twelve-months’ basic plus incentive management fee. Multiple decreases as remaining period of 
contract term decreases.
d. Combination of right of first offer, right of first refusal.
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that the management contract is voided by a 
receiver in a foreclosure, any receiver who 
does so must believe that it represents the 
entire business of the borrower, with the 
operator but a part of the overall business 
that is being foreclosed upon.
Fees and System 
Reimbursable Charges
Simple in concept, fees and system reim-
bursable charges can be complex in imple-
mentation. The idea of combining a base 
fee and an incentive fee was meant to align 
the interests of owner and operator. Opera-
tor fees could be based on both revenues 
and profits. Historically, the base and incen-
tive fees were of roughly equal magnitude 
for a hotel in a good economy with a solid 
management team. In general, base fees 
are a straightforward percentage of gross 
revenues. Some contracts define gross rev-
enues tightly so as to exclude revenues that 
are not the result of the operator’s efforts 
(e.g., a parking concession). A few opera-
tors have accepted contracts that have no 
base fee but must be assured that the incen-
tive fees provide for a reasonable fee stream 
over the term of the contract.
Incentive fee structures involve greater 
complexity and have a wide variety of 
forms in practice. At their root, incentive 
fees are the fundamental financial risk-
shifting device in the contract. With incen-
tive fees, the operator bears some risk for 
poor results and has an incentive to maxi-
mize the profit measure that serves as the 
incentive fee basis, typically GOP, gener-
ally calculated as gross revenues less oper-
ating expenses. However, the operating 
expenses do not include property taxes, 
insurance, reserves to replace FF&E, or any 
capital charges such as debt service, ground 
lease payments, or an owner’s preferred 
return. Thus, GOP is larger than the cash 
flow to the owner. Over time, owners sought 
various means to establish the incentive 
fee on cash flow after a return on capital 
and to subordinate the incentive fee to this 
return, a change meant to further align the 
owner’s and operator’s interests.
A summary of base and incentive fees is 
presented in Exhibit 3, which describes the 
two most common types of incentive fees. 
A fee based on GOP is common in Asia 
and most of Europe and the Middle East. 
When this incentive fee structure is used, 
the incentive fee percentage is often tiered, 
based on the achieved GOP margin of the 
property in any given year.3 An incentive 
fee subordinate to and based on cash flow 
after a return on assets, called an owner’s 
priority return, is commonly employed in 
North America.4
Note that while base fees are higher for 
select-service hotels operated by branded 
operators, they are lower for independent 
operators. This is due to the fact that the 
select-service hotels are rarely independent 
hotels, and the brand itself is usually bun-
dled with the management contract. For a 
hotel operated by an independent com-
pany, the owner often pays franchise fees 
in addition to the management fees.
Always a matter of some contention, 
system reimbursable charges have become 
the most controversial area of fees to 
emerge over the past ten years. These charges 
are for services provided by third-party 
3. As an example, the incentive fee could be structured as follows: a gross operating profit (GOP) percentage 
of less than 35 percent would earn an incentive fee of 6.0 percent, a GOP percentage between 35 and 40 
percent would earn an incentive fee of 7 percent, and a superior performance of a GOP percentage exceed-
ing 40 percent would trigger an incentive fee of 8 percent.
4. A typical contract would call for the incentive fee to be 10 to 30 percent of cash flow available after an 
owner’s priority return of 10 percent assets.
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affiliates of the operator or by the operator 
itself for centralized services, including fees 
for international marketing, group market-
ing, regional sales and revenue manage-
ment teams, frequent traveler programs, 
the operation of reservation systems, pur-
chasing fees, training fees, fees for provid-
ing hardware and software, centralized 
accounting services, and travel expenses 
of corporate personnel.
Operators feel that properly structured 
and administered centralized services 
increase the efficiency, pricing power, and 
effectiveness of their delivery of manage-
ment and brand services. They argue that 
their service to owners would be less 
effective at greater cost if the services 
were provided locally. Operators also argue 
that consistent implementation of a global 
brand network demands regional and cen-
tral services that are beyond the reach of 
individual hotels. Owners recognize the 
value created by centralized services but 
have concerns in three areas: whether the 
charges are fair (that is, the services are pro-
vided at their true marginal cost), the abil-
ity of the operator to impose new and 
expensive mandates over the term of the 
contract for programs not anticipated dur-
ing contract negotiations, and whether the 
effectiveness of centralized services applies 
equally from hotel to hotel.
Exhibit 3:
base and Incentive Management Fee Structures
 Basic Fee
 (Percentage of Incentive Fee
 Gross Revenues) 
  Ranges (Percentage
 Low Median High Fee Base of Fee Base)
brand operators      
Full-service  2.0  3.25  3.5  GOP  6-10
    Owner’s priority  10-30
          return
Select-service  3.0  5.0  7.0  GOP  8-12
    Owner’s priority  10-30
          return
Independent      
 operators
Full-service  1.5  4.0  6.0  GOP  5-10
    Owner’s priority  10-20
          return
Select-service  2.5  2.75  3.0  GOP  8-12
    Owner’s priority  10-30
          return
Caretaker      
 operators
all hotels  3.0  4.0  6.0  GOP  5-8
    Improved GOP  10-25
Source: Adapted from Eyster and deRoos (2009, Exhibit III-4).
Note: GOP = gross operating profit as defined in the Uniform System of Accounts for the Lodging Industry. Owner’s prior-
ity return = cash flow after owner’s priority (the owner’s priority is a return on total property investment, generally in the 
range of 8 to 12 percent).
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Owners have heretofore granted broad 
rights to operators to define and impose 
system reimbursable charges, typically 
amounting to 2.5 to 5.0 percent of total 
revenues. However, these charges continue 
to grow to the point that they are equal in 
magnitude to management fees in some 
cases. Moreover, they are difficult to total 
at any particular property as these fees are 
associated with almost every aspect of 
hotel operations and purchasing. Two paths 
regarding system reimbursable charges 
are emerging in contracts today. The first 
approach is advantageous for operators and 
continues the existing trend toward broad 
rights to define and allocate system charges 
to hotels. Some operators have inaugurated 
a different approach, in response to owners’ 
concerns, that involves a single charge that 
serves as the payment for all operator pro-
vided services over the term of the contract. 
In these cases, the system reimbursable fee 
is most commonly a fixed percentage of 
revenues, with some additional fees asso-
ciated with the traditional fee per transac-
tion for reservations.
Reporting and Controls
Two important topics are generally 
found in the category of reporting and con-
trols: territorial protection and the broad 
topic of financial reporting and budgets. 
Regarding territorial protection, owners 
feel that they should have the right to a 
reasonable trade area for their hotels and 
should not have to compete with the oper-
ator or the operator’s brands for business 
within the trade area. Operators know that 
the hotel business is highly competitive 
and that new entries are inevitable as hotel 
demand develops within a market. Their 
position is that they should not be pre-
cluded from adding hotels to a market—
especially newly developed districts in 
that market—once a given hotel is suc-
cessfully established.
In the past, owners were given little 
territorial protection, but over the years 
operators have added territorial protection 
devices in response to owner demands. 
Over the past ten years, such protections 
have generally precluded the operator from 
operating the same brand in a defined geo-
graphic area for a term of years, generally 
the initial contract term or ten years, which-
ever is less. Almost universally, the opera-
tor has the right to open hotels from the 
operator’s brand family without violating 
the territorial protection (Dev et al. forth-
coming). Most contracts shrink the geo-
graphic area over time, and some provide 
tests for adding new, same-brand proper-
ties in the market. Some operators have 
been successful in obtaining contracts that 
allow new competitors as long as the 
existing hotel is proven to be unharmed or 
that compensate the existing hotel even if it 
is harmed (sometimes referred to as impact 
provisions). Compensation can take the 
form of first rights to develop new hotels 
in the market or cash payments.
Financial reporting and the budgeting 
process are, in most cases, straightforward 
matters. Operators have long recognized 
that the hotel is being managed on behalf 
of the owner and that the owner needs 
timely and accurate reports to comply with 
accounting requirements. Owners that are 
publicly listed firms or that have fiduciary 
responsibility to their investors are respon-
sible for producing the audited records of 
the hotel; this requires the close coopera-
tion of the operator. In cases where the 
owner is a partnership or private company, 
the operator often produces the audited 
records. A recent concern has arisen for 
operators that are publicly listed firms in the 
United States. As a result of the Sarbanes-
Oxley requirements, these firms no longer 
wish to have the liability of producing the 
audited records. In these cases, the owner 
is asked to take records prepared by the 
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operator; the owner retains the services of 
an independent auditor to certify the records. 
While a bit more complicated, these pro-
cedures recognize the reality of contempo-
rary liability-management practices.
Budgets are the most contentious issue 
between owners and operators. Budgets 
are the benchmark for bonuses, for incen-
tive fees, and for performance clauses; and 
they serve as a set of goals to be achieved. 
Owners have traditionally had the right to 
approve the annual budgets for operating, 
FF&E replacement, and capital expendi-
tures. Recent contracts, however, have 
restricted these rights to the favor of the 
operator. Examples include changing the 
owners’ right to approve budgets to the right 
simply to review the budget. This is intended 
to remove the owner’s incentive to use 
annual budget approval as a negotiating 
weapon. This change is found in many con-
tracts with performance termination provi-
sions. Other changes include the right to 
exceed agreed-upon limits to FF&E replace-
ment and capital expenditures when these 
changes are framed as changes to brand 
standards. Increasingly, owners focus on the 
definitions of items that might variously be 
handled as a maintenance expense, an FF&E 
replacement, or a capital expenditure. In 
addition, owners are insisting on contract 
language and cooperation from operators 
to create and implement long-term furniture 
replacement and capital expenditure bud-
gets, due to the large sums involved and 
uncertainty over whether reserve funds 
would be sufficient to handle anticipated 
expenditures. It is becoming common for 
the contract to acknowledge a three- to 
five-year planning cycle for these items to 
facilitate strategic and cash planning.
Summary
Management contracts have become 
much more substantive and sophisticated 
over the past fifty years—and particularly 
in the past two decades. What was once a 
relatively straightforward agreement for 
one company to manage a hotel on behalf 
of another has become a multiple-contract 
set of agreements that require significant 
experience to negotiate and understand. 
Management contract practice has advanced 
substantially, and contemporary contracts 
deal with a myriad of issues—notably, real 
property rights; intellectual property rights; 
hotels as financial assets; hotels as operat-
ing businesses; and the needs of owners, 
operators, and (increasingly) lenders. Con-
tract provisions must be written to antici-
pate the needs of a property over a long 
time horizon—an average of twenty-five 
years for branded hotels and frequently as 
long as fifty years or more. As case law 
has modified the interpretation of manage-
ment contracts, the parties have revised 
them to reflect those legal precedents. The 
many influences, issues, and parties involved 
make hotel management contracts among 
the most complex property management 
contracts in commercial real estate.
Decisions made during the negotiation 
and administration of a management con-
tract can have large, lasting effects on a 
hotel, especially since those contract provi-
sions are essentially the defining relation-
ship for any given hotel. The rapid evolution 
of management contracts and the quick 
response of the parties to changing market 
conditions make careful study of contem-
porary management contracts an important 
topic for every hotel owner, operator, and 
lender. The next issue of Cornell Hospital-
ity Quarterly will extend the analysis of this 
article to examine future trends in manage-
ment contracts.
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